Building on recent work by Rosenzweig (1999), this paper re-examines the effect of AFDC benefits on early non-marital childbearing. Unlike most previous work in this area, Rosenzweig finds a statistically significant and quantitatively large positive effect of AFDC benefits. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we replicate Rosenzweig's analysis and explore the reasons his findings differ from earlier research findings. We are able to reproduce his main finding that AFDC generosity influences non-marital childbearing when state and cohort fixed-effects are included. However, we find that model specification matters a great deal. An alternative specification of state fixed-effects yields no evidence of an AFDC effect, and when we focus on fertility only through age 19 (as in prior work), we also find no AFDC effect. This latter finding implies that the behavior of women in their early 20s may be far more sensitive to welfare generosity than is that of teenagers.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we replicate and extend recent research by Mark Rosenzweig (1999) on the relationship between AFDC benefits and non-marital childbearing by young women. Most previous work on the effects of AFDC benefit levels on a wide range of demographic behaviors, including non-marital childbearing, has found a relatively weak relationship. In some papers, benefits do have a statistically significant effect that is consistent with the underlying economic hypotheses, but the effect is typically small; in many other papers, estimated effects are not statistically different from zero. Among well-known papers reaching this conclusion concerning teen fertility are Duncan and Hoffman (1990) , An, Haveman, and Wolfe (1993) , and Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) . Moffitt (1995) provides a review of the literature on non-marital fertility; see Moffitt (1992) for a general review of AFDC incentive effects.
In contrast, Rosenzweig finds that AFDC benefits have a statistically significant and quantitatively large positive effect on early non-marital fertility. The estimated impacts are among the strongest estimated links between welfare benefits and any demographic behavior to date. His analysis differed from previous work on early fertility in three important ways: (1) it included fertility through age 22, rather than just through the teen years; 2) it incorporated a marital birth as a separate choice using a multinomial logit specification; and 3) it included both state and cohort fixed effects to control for unmeasured characteristics that may influence early fertility.
Because of the continuing importance of the issue, the striking findings, and the differences in the methods used, we think further exploration of Rosenzweig's findings seems warranted. This is especially true in this case, because the NLSY data that were used by Rosenzweig have some potentially troubling features. Our goal is to re-examine his approach and findings. We first attempt to reproduce his findings, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We then explore the sensitivity of the estimates to the other distinctive features of Rosenzweig's model. Specifically, we focus on the three features of Rosenzweig's work that distinguish it from prior research the inclusion of state and cohort fixed effects, the expansion of the choice set to include distinct marital and no-birth categories, and the definition of fertility status based on behavior through age 22.
We are able to reproduce his main finding that AFDC generosity influences non-marital childbearing for women through age 22 when fixed effects are included. We find that adding state fixed effects to a model including cohort fixed effects sharply increases the estimated AFDC effect, a finding that implies a negative correlation between unmeasured state effects and AFDC benefits. We also find that model specification matters a great deal. The AFDC effect disappears when we modify the state fixed effect specification slightly or restrict the analysis to teen fertility. This latter finding implies (and supplemental analyses demonstrate) that the behavior of women in their early 20s is far more sensitive to welfare generosity than is that of teenagers. These results highlight the need for more research on non-marital childbearing in the non-teen years.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines Rosenzweig's approach and presents some concerns about problems in the NLSY data. Our data and methods are described in Section III and our findings in Section IV. The last section summarizes our findings and its implications.
II. Rosenzweig's Model Modeling Issues. In Rosenzweig's model, young women are assumed to choose among a set of multidimensional alternatives based on fertility, marriage, and residential status. In the empirical implementation of the model, the choice set includes three alternatives: having a non-marital first birth, a marital first birth, or no birth.
1 Utility in each alternative is taken to be a function of child quality and the income that would be received in that alternative.
Because income in the non-marital birth alternative is modeled as a function of AFDC benefits, the model yields the standard prediction that higher AFDC benefits will increase the probability that a woman will have a non-marital birth by increasing the maximum utility available to her following such a birth.
Explanatory variables in the model include family background measures (family income, family structure, mother's education, and race), the respondent's AFQT score, and the AFDC guarantee for a family of two, which is here averaged across ages 12 to 20. Also included in the model are fixed effects for state of residence in 1979 and for birth cohort to control for unmeasured state or cohort preferences that may be correlated with AFDC benefits. Since states choose their benefit levels and since these benefits vary substantially across states, a correlation between welfare benefits and other state characteristics is certainly plausible, and, if present, would bias estimates of the AFDC effect on early fertility.
Control for state fixed effects requires panel data, since otherwise the fixed effect is perfectly correlated with AFDC benefits and cannot be identified. When panel data are available, it is appropriate to control for birth cohort as well because of the well-known time trend in early non-marital childbearing. When analyses of panel data include both state and cohort fixed-effects, the effect of AFDC on early fertility is identified by cross-state variation in the time trend in welfare benefits.
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Two previous studies of AFDC effects have controlled for state fixed effects in analyses of the determinants of female headship; there are, to our knowledge, no such fixed-effect models estimated for other specific demographic flows, such as marriage, divorce, or early fertility. Moffitt (1994) uses CPS data from 1968 to 1989 for a sample of women age 20-44 with less than 12 years of education. Without fixed effects but with controls for observable state-level labor market conditions, he finds a modest statistically significant positive effect of benefit levels on the probability that a woman is a female head for white women and no effect for black women. For both whites and blacks, the addition of state fixed effects produces a negative and statistically significant AFDC effect.
4 Hoynes (1997) , who uses the PSID, similarly finds that control for state fixed effects eliminates an apparent AFDC effect on headship for white women. For black women, she finds that the AFDC effect is roughly halved by control for state effects, but remains positive and statistically significant. 5 The results in Moffitt and in Hoynes for white women are consistent with a positive benefitsunobservables relationship so that non-fixed-effect estimates are biased upward. Hoynes reports that the correlation between state benefits and state fixed effects are negative for black women in the PSID.
Rosenzweig's model is estimated as a multinomial logit, where the probability that individual i is observed in alternative j (no birth, non-marital birth, marital birth) is given by 1) P ij = exp(V ij ) / exp(V ik ), k= 1...3 k and where V ij , the maximum utility for individual i in alternative j, is a linear function of a set of family background variables (X), AFDC benefits (W), a state fixed effect ( ), a cohort effect ( ), and an unobserved random error term ( ):
2) V ij = X i j + j W i + ij + ij + ij Equation (2) is best regarded as a reduced form in which the determinants of utility other than W (for example, marriage and labor market prospects) are treated as a function of family background rather than modeled directly.
6 As (2) indicates, the estimated coefficients for the AFDC benefits variable capture the impact of AFDC on the utility of each alternative. The underlying choice model suggests that nmb > mb > nob , where the subscripts refer to the three fertility categories. This follows because AFDC benefits ought to have little or no effect on utility for women who do not have a birth and who are therefore categorically ineligible for welfare assistance, only an insurance effect on women with marital births who are either categorically ineligible or eligible for reduced benefits under the AFDC-UP program, and a direct effect on women with a non-marital birth since many of them will receive these benefits. If all coefficients are normalized to zero for the "no birth" alternative (i.e., it is the omitted category in the estimation of the model) then the theory implies nmb > mb 0.
Data Issues. The NLSY has the substantial advantages of providing a very large sample that facilitates estimation of state fixed-effects in the case of a dichotomous dependent variable, of having an ability measure, and of having had a very low attrition rate. 7 There are, however, several potentially important problems which were the initial motivation for our re-analysis. First, the NLSY provides information about state of residence only at birth, age 14, and then for all years beginning in 1979. Thus, state of residence is unknown at ages 12, 13, and 15 to 20 for the women in the sample who were age 21 in 1979, at ages 12, 13, and 15 to 19 for the women who were age 20 in 1979, and so on. On average, then, residence is unknown for approximately half of all at-risk years, and in those years, it is impossible to accurately assign the AFDC benefits for which a young woman would be eligible in the event of a birth. 8 To the best of our knowledge, all other papers using the NLSY to analyze the effect of AFDC benefits on teen fertility have limited the sample to women aged 14-15 or 14-16 in 1979 for whom the full range of at-risk years can be observed. The error introduced by this depends on the extent of interstate mobility and differences across states in benefit levels. We explore below whether Rosenzweig's estimates are sensitive to this issue.
Second, information on parental income (another important independent variable in models of fertility) is not available in the NLSY. Information is available on parental occupation at age 14 as reported by the teen, and Rosenzweig uses that to impute parental income using mean income by occupation from the 1970 Census. This imputation is likely to be inaccurate for several reasons: 1) there is no information on parental hours or weeks of employment that would be helpful in imputing earnings from occupation; 2) there is substantial variation in income within occupation; and 3) children's report of parental occupation could be subject to substantial error. In general, measurement error will bias the estimated family income coefficient downward and may result in an overestimate of the impact of AFDC.
There is also a puzzling and non-trivial difference in the underlying fertility data in the NLSY and the PSID. Rosenzweig's NLSY sample (from his Table 1) yields a substantially lower absolute and relative proportion of non-marital births through age 22 than the PSID. Approximately 10% of the women in Rosenzweig's NLSY sample had a non-marital birth by age 22 and 28% of women with a birth by age 22 had a non-marital birth first birth; in the PSID, the corresponding proportions are 14.5% and 41.5%, about 40% higher. Using Vital Statistics data, we calculated the proportion of all births to women in these cohorts that were non-marital through age 22 and then converted that proportion (using auxiliary information on mean births for women with and without a non-marital birth) into the proportion of women with births who have had a non-marital birth. This procedure yields proportions very similar to those from the PSID and substantially higher than in Rosenzweig's sample. 10 We do not know how to account for the difference between the data sets in these fertility measures nor what impact it may have had on estimates.
Thus, in our view, the NLSY data, while well-suited for this kind of research in many respects, have enough potential weaknesses for the analysis of AFDC impacts on early fertility to make replication with an independent data set a valuable exercise.
III. Data and Model Specification
Our data come from the PSID. Because all children of the original sample members are themselves part of the sample, the PSID provides an ongoing sample of young women passing through their teen years. Family background information comes from the core PSID files, while marriage and fertility information are taken from the 1985-1991 Childbirth and Adoption History File. Note that women who give birth while cohabitating will typically be classified as having a non-marital birth, just as in Vital Statistics tabulations.
10 Details of this procedure are available from the authors. When we directly examined fertility with the NLSY data from the 1987 interview schedule, we found that 12% of the women in the sample (N=5311) had a non-marital birth by age 22 and 24% had a marital birth, so that one-third of the women with births had a non-marital birth. This figure is about midway between the proportions reported by Rosenzweig and those from the PSID.
The PSID has its own weaknesses for this kind of analysis. Most importantly, sample size per cohort is substantially smaller than in the NSLY roughly 150 per birth cohort in the PSID vs 600 in the NLSY. As we discuss more fully below, this poses a problem for estimating state fixed effects for a dichotomous outcome variable like early non-marital fertility that is relatively rare in some states. Additionally, the PSID lacks an ability measure like the AFQT. If women with low ability tend to live in low-benefit states but are more likely to have a non-marital birth, then the impact of ability on non-marital childbearing will be confounded with that of AFDC generosity (and the impact of AFDC underestimated). Finally, the PSID has had higher rates of attrition than the NLSY. Annual attrition in the PSID has averaged about 2-3% except for the first year when it exceeded 10%. Cumulative attrition in the PSID exceeds 40% for the age group in our sample. Recent research by Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) concludes that while PSID attriters differ systematically from individuals who remain in the study, regression estimates of slope coefficients for many typical behavioral models are unaffected. The effect of attrition on any particular analysis is, nevertheless, an open issue.
At the same time, the problems of the NLSY are not present in the PSID. State of residence is known for all relevant years for the sample we use, so AFDC benefits can be assigned correctly for all at-risk years. Information on family income during adolescence is collected directly from the parent and is available for a period of years, which enables us to construct a more stable and accurate measure. And, as noted previously, non-marital fertility in the PSID seems to track more closely with Vital Statistics proportions.
We estimate the model in a variety of specifications. The simplest is a model like Rosenzweig's, but without any fixed effects. We then control for birth cohort and then for both cohort and state or residence at age 14. These models are estimated both for the full sample and for a sample of women from low-income families. Like Rosenzweig, we measure AFDC benefits as the average for a family of two at ages 12-20 for the state of residence. Family income is measured as the average at ages 12-14. We allow for non-linear effects of mother's education by creating dummy variables for education greater than and less than high school graduation. As in any application of a fixed-effect logit model, we can estimate a fixed effect only for states in which each fertility alternative is chosen by at least one person in the state sample. This occurs because the best estimate of a state's fixed effect for an alternative chosen by no women (or by all women) in that state is negative (positive) infinity, thereby making the predicted probability of that outcome effectively zero (or one) for all individuals in that state. This is true regardless of the values of estimates for other coefficients in the model. Because of this, individuals in these states contribute no information to the estimation of these other parameters, including AFDC benefits.
11 Since both marital and non-marital births to young women are relatively infrequent events in some populations, this can pose a problem for small to moderate states for which sample sizes in the PSID are often quite small. In all, 42 states and the District of Columbia are represented in our PSID sample, but some of the smaller ones lack the necessary variation across outcomes. Even among states with larger samples, there are no women in our sample with non-marital births by age 22 in MA or CT and no women with marital births by age 22 in DC, so state fixed effects cannot be estimated for them and they must be excluded from the fixed-effect model. 12 We emphasize that this is a standard fixed-effect logit feature, widely used in sibling models (see Geronimus and Korenman; Hoffman, Furstenberg, and Foster) . Table 1 presents basic information on our sample. All of the entries are weighted using the sample weights provided by the PSID, which adjust both for differences in initial selection probabilities and in subsequent attrition, and which are designed to produce population estimates. See Hill (1992) for further information on the PSID sample design and the use of sample weights.
Our sample includes 1806 women for whom we have a full residential history beginning at age 12 (i.e., they were no older than age 12 in 1968, the first interviewing year of the PSID), who were at least age 22 by 1991, the last year of data that we use, and who have non-missing data on marital status at first birth. 14 This sample includes the eight birth cohorts included in Rosenzweig's sample plus five more recent birth cohorts. About 15% of the sample had a non-marital birth and about 20% had a marital birth by age 22.
11 See Chamberlain, 1980 for further information. In addition, logit estimation routines do not converge properly as they iterate toward plus or minus infinity for the relevant fixed effect. 12 Observations by state in the PSID often reflect cluster-sampling and do not necessarily provide representative samples of women in those states. Both CT and MA have had teen birth rates that are about 75% below the national average and thus they have quite low proportions of women with an early first non-marital birth. DC s teen non-marital birth rate is well above the national average and only 5% to 10% of teen births during this time period were marital. The PSID samples for these states are obviously more extreme than this, but are explicable given the relatively small samples. 13 In those cases, only siblings in families in which outcomes differ across siblings are included in the analysis. We emphasize that our goal (and Rosenzweig s) is quite different from that of Moffitt or Hoynes, who were interested not only in determining bias, but also in generating meaningful estimates of state effects. In both papers, the sample is restricted to individuals in states with a substantial number of observations (50-75 in Hoynes, 35 in Moffitt) . There is no reason to do that in our estimation; doing so would only result in the loss of information.
14 We have done some minor recoding of marital status at birth for cases with missing data where there was sufficient data in the marriage histories to make an unambiguous assignment. About 15 cases were deleted because of missing marital status information. We have also corrected a PSID coding error for births to never-married women between 1989 and 1991, following the procedure suggested by the PSID staff.
Average AFDC benefits, measured in 1985 dollars, were $338; there is a steady downward trend in average benefits across the birth cohorts (not shown in the table) reflecting the decline in real AFDC benefits. About one-fifth of the sample resided at age 14 in a family with an absent or non-working father and a slightly higher percentage had a mother with less than a high school education. About one-sixth of the women in the sample are black.
IV. Findings
Table 2 presents our multinomial logit estimates for the full sample and for a subsample of women from low-income households. 15 Because estimates for the birth cohorts corresponding to the NLSY sample and for a larger sample that includes five more recent cohorts are quite similar, we present only the estimates for the latter, where sample sizes are larger and the state fixed effects are more readily estimated. All of the models include as independent variables the variables listed in Table 1 . To make the table manageable, we present only the estimates of the AFDC effect. The omitted category in the table is "no birth," for which all coefficients are normalized to zero. A full set of estimates for the fixed-effect model are presented in Appendix Table 1 .
Row 1A of the table reproduces Rosenzweig's findings for the full NLSY sample; his estimates for a low-income sample are shown in 2A. The estimated AFDC coefficient is positive and statistically significant for a non-marital birth for both samples and is quite small and statistically insignificant for a marital birth. These estimates imply a large quantitative effect of AFDC benefits on the proportion of women with a nonmarital birth. Rosenzweig reports that a one standard deviation decrease in AFDC benefits, equivalent to a 37% decline in mean benefits, would cause the probability of a non-marital birth to fall from .104 to .073 (a decline of 30%) for the full sample and from .170 to .096 (-43%) for the low-income sample. These are large changes by any standard. 16 The PSID results for the full sample of women are shown in panel 1B. As shown in the first row, there is no AFDC effect on a non-marital birth in a model using observed variables only, although there is a statistically significant negative effect of AFDC benefits for a marital birth. When we add cohort fixed effects, both coefficient estimates become stronger, although the non-marital birth effect is still not statistically significant. This increase in the estimated non-marital birth effect in this specification is quite plausible: the cohort effects help account for the otherwise contrary time-series relationship between falling real AFDC benefits terms and rising non-marital fertility.
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When we add state fixed effects, the estimates change radically. The estimated AFDC coefficient for a non-marital birth increases by a factor of five, while the effect on a marital birth is now effectively zero. These estimates are quite similar to Rosenzweig's, and they are clearly consistent with the underlying behavioral hypotheses about the effect of AFDC benefits on fertility. Unlike the other PSID estimates, they imply that AFDC raises the likelihood of a non-marital birth by directly raising the utility associated with that alternative relative to the other two alternatives.
How large are these effects in practical terms? The net effect of a variable on the choice probabilities depends on the full pattern of coefficient estimates, and neither sign nor magnitude can be directly inferred from the estimates. 18 We find that the quantitative impacts of the various estimates range from modest to substantial. In the first model (observables only), a 25% increase in AFDC benefits (about $90 per month) would increase the proportion with a non-marital birth from 15.5% to 16.3%, which is about a five-percent increase. In the dual fixed-effects model, a 25% increase in benefits would cause the proportion of women with an early non-marital birth to rise by more than one-third, from 15.5% to 21%. This is clearly a very sizeable impact by any standard.
Estimates for Low-Income Women. The bottom portion of Table 2 presents the corresponding estimates for women from low-income families, defined here as women from families with average income at ages 12-14 or less than $20,000 in 1980 dollars. 19 These women are more likely to be black (about one-third vs one-sixth for the full samples), and come from families with an absent father (almost 50%) and a mother with less than a high-school education (47%). On average, they come from states that provide AFDC benefits that are about 20% lower than for the full sample. They are much more likely to have had a birth by age 22 than the full sample. Approximately 28% have had a non-marital birth and 24% a marital birth by age 22.
With no fixed effects, we find a positive and statistically significant estimated effect of AFDC benefits on a non-marital birth. The estimated coefficient for a marital birth is negative, but it is small and not statistically significant, so these estimates imply a positive effect of AFDC benefits on non-marital fertility. Controlling for cohort again increases the magnitude of both coefficient estimates, and the marital birth effect is now negative and statistically significant. Adding state effects doubles the non-marital birth estimate, although because the standard error rises nearly four-fold, the estimate is just short of the 10% level of statistical significance. The marital birth coefficient is now effectively zero.
The quantitative impacts of these estimates are again substantial. In the model with no fixed effects, a 25% increase in AFDC benefits would increase the proportion of women from low-income families with a non-marital birth by about 13%, from 28% to nearly 32%. The full fixed-effect estimates yield effects that are much larger and are very similar to those for the full sample.
The enormous increase in the non-marital birth coefficient estimates in both samples when state fixed-effects are included is somewhat unexpected in light of previous research on female headship in which inclusion of state effects typically reduced or eliminated the estimated effect of AFDC benefits. The increase in the estimates implies a negative correlation between unobserved preferences and AFDC benefits benefits are apparently higher in states with less favorable average preferences for early non-marital fertility. Rosenzweig does not present estimates without fixed effects, so we do not know whether this unusual pattern exists in his data as well.
As we have already noted, we necessarily deleted in our state fixed-effect models observations from states without variation across alternatives, including cases from three states with relatively large samples (CT, MA and DC) and from several smaller ones. This is standard fixed-effects practice, but it does introduce the possibility that the change in estimates is due to the change in the sample itself. We can include these observations in the model by modifying the fixed-effect specification, writing it in terms of a region effect estimated for all observations and a state effect estimated only for states in which there is the necessary variation across alternatives. In this specification, the total state fixed effect is the sum of a region and a state effect, with the state effect now reflecting its difference from the average region effect. We appreciate that this is not a perfect specification; specification error is possible if the states within a region are very different. (The same objection applies to state effects, when states are heterogeneous). Nevertheless, we think it is instructive, since control for region is a perfectly sensible fixed-effect strategy in its own right and it provides a way to include observations from these other states.
We estimate this model using all 1806 observations and defining nine regions using Census Bureau definitions. Despite the fact that the model differs only modestly from the other fixed-effect model, it yields radically different estimates of AFDC effects. The estimated effect of a non-marital birth is .0008 (se=.002), and the marital birth estimate is -.0018 (se=.0017). Thus, in this model there is absolutely no AFDC effect on non-marital or marital fertility. That this change is not matter of sample but of specification can be seen in two ways. First, when we use estimate this fixed-effect specification but use only the 1657 cases used in the standard fixed-effect model, we get coefficient estimates very similar to the estimates for all 1806 cases. Second, when we use only those 1657 cases but estimate a model without any fixed effects (like the one reported in Table 2 , Row 1B), we get coefficients very similar to the ones reported in Table 2 .
We do not interpret this as evidence that the other estimates are incorrect or that the PSID is inherently problematic for state fixed-effect estimates (although it is not an ideal data set for those models). But it is clear that fixed-effect estimates are sensitive to very modest sample respecification. There is relatively little within-state across-cohort variation to identify the AFDC coefficient, and estimates are clearly sensitive to modest changes in specification. We urge other researchers to consider the robustness of their estimates when using models of this kind.
Sensitivity Analysis. As we have noted, Rosenzweig's analysis is distinguished by three features: the inclusion the state and cohort fixed effects, the extension to fertility through older ages, and the extension of the choice set. We have already examined the impact of adding the fixed effects. In Table 3 , we examine these other issues.
In the first two sections of the table, we consider the impact of extending the analysis through age 22 by estimating separate models for first births through age 19 and at ages 20-22. We include results from models with and without the fixed effects. The AFDC variable used here is modified to reflect the different time frames; for teen births, we use an average over ages 12-17, while for the non-teen births, we average over ages 16-20. 20 It is clear that the behavioral response to AFDC benefits varies substantially for teens and women in their early 20s. For teen births, without fixed effects, there is no effect on non-marital births but a large and statistically significant negative effect on marital births. But when the fixed effects are added, both effects are small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the age 20-22 estimates indicate a very substantial and statistically significant impact of AFDC benefits on the choice of marital vs non-marital births when fixed effects are included.
In the third row, we consider the impact of distinguishing childless women from those with marital births by estimating a binomial logit model of whether a young woman has a non-marital birth. As shown, 20 We are grateful to a referee for making this suggestion. These modified AFDC measures, while conceptually preferable, are very highly correlated with the age 12-20 measure used elsewhere (>.96) and the estimates are very similar to those using that measure.
the results are quite similar to what we found with the expanded choice set no effect in the absence of fixed effects and a large effect when fixed effects are included. Thus, expansion of the choice set, while appropriate, is not the source of the distinctive findings.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of Rosenzweig's findings to another key feature of the analysis, the imputation of AFDC benefits in the NLSY for out-of-sample years where state of residence is unknown. Prior to Rosenzweig, virtually all researchers have limited NLSY analyses to those age 14-15 in 1979 for whom a full residential history over the teen years is known. This practice effectively precludes estimation of state fixed-effect models, because there is then insufficient time-series variation in AFDC benefits across cohorts to identify an AFDC effect. We imitated the NLSY imputation of AFDC benefits with the PSID by using only the information on state of residence beginning in 1979, ignoring the available residential information for all previous years. The sample used is the full sample from the fixed-effect models reported in Table 2 . This procedure yielded an incorrect measure of average AFDC benefits for about 10% of the sample, with an average error of about 20% of the correct value. As shown in the fourth row of the table, the estimates of AFDC effects, shown for the fixed-effect model, are actually lower than when the correct benefits are used and the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.
V. Discussion and Summary
Building on recent work by Rosenzweig, we have estimated a variety of models of the marital and non-marital fertility of young women, with special attention to the effect of state and cohort fixed effects on AFDC estimates. Like Rosenzweig, we find a strong effect of welfare generosity on non-marital childbearing once these fixed effects are included. In our models, inclusion of the fixed-effects increased our AFDC estimates substantially, a result that implies a negative correlation between preferences and benefit levels by state and which is somewhat at odds with the limited previous literature that estimate models both with and without state fixed effects.
Because the results for the PSID and NLSY are so similar, our analyses provide some insight into the impact of methodological differences between Rosenzweig's findings and prior research. We find that estimates of AFDC effects on early non-marital births are very sensitive to inclusion of state effects and also to the exact specification of the state fixed effect. For example, a modest re-specification in which we included cases from states that would otherwise be eliminated from the fixed-effect model and modified the fixed-effect specification yielded no evidence of an AFDC effect on early non-marital fertility. Our results also suggest that extending the choice set is not the source of Rosenzweig's findings, but that the extension of the age range may be. When we define behavior based on fertility status through age 19, welfare generosity has no impact on non-marital childbearing, even when we include even when we include both state and cohort fixed effects. However, when we focus on women in their early 20s, we find very large effects, especially when fixed effects are included.
Because our goal in this paper was to replicate and examine Rosenzweig's findings, we adopted his specification of fixed effects. It is worth noting, however, that the state fixed effect is somewhat peculiar in this application, since it is defined as of a single point in time, while behavior is measured over an extended time period subsequent to that time. The state fixed effect thus potentially lumps together young women who may have spent very different amounts of time in the state in which they lived at age 14 (us) or 1979 (Rosenzweig) , and it may therefore capture only imperfectly an individual's exposure to state-level factors. There is also some inconsistency in assuming the constancy of state effects, which are necessary for the estimation and which presumably capture stable preferences, when AFDC benefit levels are varying over time across states, as is required for identification of the AFDC effect in the first place.
Our findings highlight several questions for future research. There is a continuing need for added research on other state-level characteristics and policies that influence fertility and marital decisions. It is hard to interpret the increase in parameter estimates in the fixed-effect models without some understanding of the substantive meaning of the state fixed effects, i.e., of what the preferences and characteristics actually are. .0002 (.0016) a All models include average parental income at ages 12-14, number of siblings, and dummy variables for race, mother's education(<12, >12), whether the father was absent or had no earned income at ages 12-14, and state and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. 
